2016 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

2-4-2016

Edwin Morales-Redrovan v. Attorney General United States

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016

Recommended Citation
"Edwin Morales-Redrovan v. Attorney General United States" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 113.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/113

This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 15-2263
_______________
EDWIN PATRICIO MORALES-REDROVAN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
_______________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A088-648-505)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Miriam K. Mills
_______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 20, 2016
BEFORE: FISHER, CHAGARES AND COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: February 4, 2016)
______________
OPINION*
_____________
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Edwin P. Morales-Redrovan petitions for review of an order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen. We will deny the petition.
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not

I.
A citizen and national of Ecuador who entered the United States without
inspection, Morales-Redrovan eventually retained Ephraim Tahir Mella, Esq. and his
associates to represent him in his removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denied Morales-Redrovan’s application for cancellation of removal because of a failure
to demonstrate his presence in the United States for the requisite time period and to
establish that his qualifying relatives would suffer extreme and exceptionally unusual
hardship in the event that he were removed from the United States. Relying on the
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement, the BIA dismissed his
administrative appeal. Represented by a different attorney, Morales-Redrovan
unsuccessfully requested a one-year stay of removal.
Morales-Redrovan retained new counsel, who filed on his behalf a motion to
reopen (as well as a request for a stay of removal) alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel on the part of Mella and his associates. The BIA denied both motions. The
motion to reopen was denied “because the respondent has not demonstrated prejudice.”
(AR3 (citing Fadiga v. Attorney General, 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir. 2007)).) According
to the BIA, in order to qualify for cancellation of removal, an alien must demonstrate that
his or her removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his
qualifying relatives. This standard requires a showing of hardship substantially beyond
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that which would ordinarily be faced by a qualifying relative upon the alien’s removal.
Morales-Redrovan argued that his former counsel should have prepared him differently
and asked him to provide additional evidence. “However, the respondent has not
submitted additional evidence demonstrating that his removal would prima facie satisfy
the requirements of cancellation. Therefore, he has not demonstrated prejudice.” (Id.)
II.
In order to prevail on a motion to reopen premised on the ineffective assistance of
counsel, Morales-Redrovan had to show, inter alia, that he was prejudiced by his former
counsel’s actions.1 See, e.g., Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 158-59. “This Court determined that
prejudice exists in the context of an immigration-based ineffective assistance of counsel
claim where there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that an IJ would not have entered a
removal order in proceedings ‘absent [former] counsel’s errors.’” (Petitioner’s Brief at
18 (quoting Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 158-59).) A reasonable likelihood or probability consists
of a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. See, e.g., Fadiga, 488
F.3d at 160-61. In turn, the Attorney General may cancel removal if, among other things,
the alien establishes that his or her removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

1

We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
A BIA order denying a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006). The BIA abuses its discretion if its
ruling is “‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.’” Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166,
174 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994)).
3

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen. MoralesRedrovan argues that the BIA irrationally failed to find that he was prejudiced.
According to him, it appears impossible not to conclude that there was a reasonable
likelihood of a different outcome in the removal proceedings “if the Petitioner were
prepared for trial, had been educated about evidence relevant to support his application
for relief, and had the record in his case been reviewed by Attorney Mella or his
subordinates in advance of Mr. Morales-Redrovan’s merits hearing.” (Petitioner’s Brief
at 24 (citing AR7).) He also asserts that the BIA abused its discretion by claiming that
the record did not demonstrate his prima facie eligibility to seek cancellation of removal.
However, the BIA appropriately determined that Morales-Redrovan failed to establish a
reasonable likelihood that he would have satisfied the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” prong in the absence of his former attorneys’ allegedly deficient
performance. As the BIA indicated, he did not submit (or even identify) the specific
evidence that former counsel should have presented in the prior proceedings. Without
this evidence, Morales-Redrovan did not establish a reasonable likelihood of the agency
finding that his removal would result in hardship “substantially beyond that which would
ordinarily be faced by a qualifying relative upon the removal of the alien.” (AR3 (citing
In re Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001)).)
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Morales-Redrovan’s petition for review.
4

